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Using an overlapping generations production-economy model characterised by ﬁnancial repression, pur-
poseful government expenditures and tax collection costs, we analyse whether ﬁnancial repression can
be explained by the cost of raising taxes. We show that with public expenditures affecting utility of the
agents, modest costs of tax collection tend to result in ﬁnancial repression being pursued as an optimal
policy by the consolidated government. However, when public expenditures are purposeless, the above
result only holds for relatively higher costs of tax collection. But, more importantly, costs of tax collection
cannot produce a monotonic increase in the reserve requirements. Of critical importance in this regard, are
the weights the consumer assigns to the public good in the utility function and the size of the government.
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11 Introduction
Using an overlapping generations production-economy model, characterised by costly tax enforcement, we analyse
the relationship between the costs of tax collection and ﬁnancial repression. We follow the dominant trend in the
literature1 in deﬁning ﬁnancial repression through an obligatory “high” reserve deposit ratio requirement, that the
banks in the economy need to maintain.2 Speciﬁcally, we analyse whether the “high” reserve requirements in a closed
economy characterised by costly tax collection, are a fall out of a welfare maximising decision of the government,
which has access to income taxation and seigniorage as sources of revenue.
Given that the concern is not whether ﬁnancial repression is prevalent, but rather the associated degree to which an
economyisrepressed, sincebothdevelopedanddevelopingeconomiesmayresorttosuchrestrictivepolicies(Espinosa
and Yip (1996)). The pertinent question is why, if at all, would a government want to repress the ﬁnancial system? This
seems paradoxical, especially when one takes into account the well documented importance of the role of ﬁnancial
intermediation process in economic activity, mainly via the ﬁnance-growth nexus.3 High cash reserve requirements
enhance the size of the implicit tax base and, making ﬁnancial repression lucrative for the government. Alternative
explanations of ﬁnancial repression (with varied levels of success) have ranged from:
 Inefﬁcient tax systems (Cukierman et al (1992)) and Giovannini and De Melo (1993)) and tax evasion (Roubini
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Gupta (2005, 2006, 2008b) and Gupta and Ziramba (2008a)).
 Degree of ﬁnancial development (Di Giorgio (1999)) and asymmetric information (Gupta (2006)) and banking
crisis (Gupta (2005)).
 Productive public expenditure (Basu (2001)) and bureaucratic corruption (Gupta and Ziramba (2008b)).
 Currency substitution (Gupta (2008a)).
1See for example, Drazen (1989), Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), Haslag and Hein (1995), Espinosa and Yip (1996), Haslag (1998), Haslag and
Koo (1999), Bhattacharya and Haslag (2001), Gupta (2005, 2006, 2008a) and Gupta and Ziramba (2008a, b) amongst others.
2Financial repression, though, can involve other sets of government legal restrictions, such as interest rate ceilings and compulsory credit
allocation with “high” reserve requirements, that prevent the ﬁnancial intermediaries from functioning at their full capacity level. However, given
the wave of interest rate deregulation in the 1980s, and the removal of credit ceilings some years earlier, the major form of ﬁnancial repression is
currently via obligatory reserve requirements (Caprio et al. (2001)).
3See Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Agbetsiafa (2004), Acaravci and Ozturk (2007) and Bose et al. (2007).
2In this paper, we analyse whether we can add costs of tax collection to this list.
The motivation for believing that costly tax collection can be a possible rationale for ﬁnancial repression, can be
outlined as follows: If tax collection is costly and is increasing at an increasing rate in taxes (Bird and Zolt (2005)
and Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007)), with two sources of revenue, namely, taxation and seigniorage, the government
might want to increase either the money supply growth rate (rate of the inﬂation tax) and the reserve requirements (the
seigniorage base), or only one of these revenue sources, as part of a welfare-maximising strategy. Given that the size of
the reserve requirement is our metric for ﬁnancial repression, we could thus check if increases in costs of tax collection
can be a rationale for a more restrictive policy as a welfare maximising outcome. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the ﬁrst study to analyse costly tax collection as a rationale for ﬁnancial repression.
Alternatively, the current study can also be viewed as an analysis that looks into the optimal mix of explicit and
implicit taxation of a consolidated government in the presence of costs of collecting direct taxation. In this regard, this
paper is comparable to Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007). In this paper, the authors show that in the presence of positive
and endogenous costs of tax collection, i.e., with the cost of tax collection depending on the resources spent by the
government to improve monitoring of tax payers, growth-maximising direct and (consumption) indirect taxation are
negatively related to their respective (and cross) costs of tax collection. However, the growth-maximising value of the
consumption tax rate is zero when collection costs do not exist, and hence, the government relies completely on direct
taxes. Further, with no costs of tax collection, the welfare optimising outcome indicates the direct and consumption
taxes to be substitutable, which is also the case with exogenous cost of tax collection.
Finally, under exogenous costs of tax enforcement, the growth-maximising consumption taxation is found to be
negatively related to its “own” degree of inefﬁciency in collecting indirect taxation, and an increase in collection costs
associated with direct (indirect) taxation leads to a reduction (increment) in the optimal income tax rate. By adding
money to the model, we analyse the role of seigniorage (the implicit tax) relative to the explicit direct tax in the
presence of cost of tax enforcement. Thus, though the main motive of our analysis is to relate ﬁnancial repression to
the cost of tax collection. As stated previously, our study is quite similar to what Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007) do,
especially in terms of the issues we address on ‘optimal’ explicit and implicit taxation when there are costs involved
in raising direct taxes. Our framework though, is much simpler than the one adapted by Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 outlines the economic environment, while section 3
3derives the optimal policy decisions for the benevolent government under alternative sizes of the cost of tax collection.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
The economy is populated by four types of agents, namely, consumers, entrepreneurs, banks (ﬁnancial intermediaries),
and a consolidated government-monetary authority. All consumers are endowed with a ﬁxed amount of resources, y,
which is normalised to 1. Entrepreneurs are also endowed with a ﬁxed amount of resources, W, which is also nor-
malised to 1 and have access to a production technology. Both consumers and entrepreneurs are uniformly distributed
in the [0, 1] interval: agents within each class are a continuum with a population normalised to 1. Each agent lives
for two periods. When consumers are old, their preferences are deﬁned over a consumption good and a public good.4
Financial intermediation has a crucial role to play, because on the one hand it provides the consumers with a safe way
of transferring resources to the future, while on the other hand, banks provide external ﬁnance to entrepreneurs who
need it to implement their investment projects. Time is discrete and there is an inﬁnite sequence of agents indexed by
t = 1, 2, 3,......1.
2.1 Agents’ behaviour
2.1.1 Consumers
When the consumer is young, he or she is endowed with y units of the consumption good. The consumer invests the net
tax endowment in bank deposits. When the consumer is old, he or she retires, and consumes the savings accumulated
over his or her lifetime. Thus, at time t, there are two coexisting generations of young and old. N people are born at
each time point t = 1. At date t =1, there exist N people in the economy, called the initial old, who live for only one
period. At each date t 1, N people are born (the young generation) and N people are beginning the second period
of their life (the old generation). Note, the population is constant and hence N, is normalised to 1.
Formally, the consumer does not choose anything. What he or she consumes is directly determined from the budget
constraint, as follows:
4Our economic environment is similar to that of Bacchetta and Caminal (1992) and Di Giorgio (1999).
















(1 + idt+1)dt (3)
To check for the robustness of our results, we also look at a scenario where the utility of the consumer only depends







where U(:) is the utility function, with the standard assumption of positive and diminishing marginal utilities in
both goods;  (1  ) is the weight the consumer assigns to the consumption (public) good in the utility function; ct+1
(gt+1) are the old age consumption of the consumption good (public good); dt are the real deposits held in period t;
t is the tax rate at period t; pt is the price of the consumption good at period t; idt+1 is the nominal interest rate on
bank deposits. Each unit of the consumption good placed into deposits at date t yields a real deposit rate (1+rdt+1) =
(1+idt+1)
1+t+1 with (1+t+1) =
pt+1
pt as the gross inﬂation rate, units of the consumption good at date t+1. As consumption
only takes place in the second period of life, the savings function is inelastic with respect to its return. This assumption
makes computations much easier and seems to be a good approximation of the real world.5
2.1.2 Entrepreneurs
All entrepreneurs are endowed with W units of the consumption good. The technology is such that, by investing one
unit of the consumption good at time t,  > 1 units are produced at time t+1. Let  be the marginal product of capital
of a single technological unit and let yt+1 be the level of output at time t + 1. Then:
yt+1 = Kt (5)
5See Hall (1988).
5Let Lt be the nominal quantity of loans that entrepreneurs can borrow from banks. Capital investment, Kt, is
constrained by the available sources of ﬁnancing:
Kt = W + lt (6)
where lt = Lt
pt . The entrepreneurs pay a gross interest rate (1 + ilt+1) on the amount borrowed in time period t. The
entrepreneur’s problem can be formalised as follows:
pt+1Ce
t+1 = pt+1yt+1   (1 + ilt+1)ptlt (7)
where Ce
t+1 represents the entrepreneur’s consumption in the second period.
Banks receive the deposits dt and are subjected to a standard cash reserve requirements, which constrain the banks
to hold at least t of each unit of the consumption good deposited, in the form of money. In equilibrium, with money
beingreturn-dominated, bankswillholdexactlyafractiont inﬁatmoney. LetMt denotenominalmoneybalancesper
young person, then Mt = tptdt holds. The remaining deposits are invested into loans that are given to entrepreneurs.
Lt  (1   )(1   )y (8)





good in period t+1. The depositors cannot lend directly to the entrepreneurs, and hence require the banks to perform
a pooling function on their behalf. Thus, the only available form of savings for the consumers is the deposits with the
ﬁnancial intermediaries. Because ﬁat money does not pay any interest rate, the gross real return on money between t
and t+1 is 1
1+t+1. Throughout the analysis, we restrict our attention to equilibria where money is return dominated,
or 1 + xt+1 >(1=(1 + t+1)). Alternatively, (1 + ilt+1)>1.
The banking sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive and banks have access to a costless intermediation
technology. Proﬁtmaximisationonbehalfofthebankscausesthegrossrealreturnondepositstobeaweightedaverage
of the returns from the investment and money, with the weights being the deﬁned reserve-deposit ratio. Formally,




must hold. Further, for the entrepreneurs to have an incentive to invest, the following constraint must bind in equilib-
6rium:
[W + lt   (1 + xt+1)lt]  W (10)
which, in turn, implies that (1 + xt+1)= .
2.2 The consolidated government
The government is assumed to be inﬁnitely-lived. It purchases gt units of the consumption good. In the ﬁrst sce-
nario, the public good is assumed to be useful in the sense that it yields direct-utility to the agents, while, in the second
scenario, government expenditures are useless. These expenditures are ﬁnanced through income taxation and seignior-
age. Moreover the government faces explicit costs of raising taxes, 1
22
t y. As in Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007), we
assume these costs are increasing with the tax rate at an increasing rate, and also increasing at a constant rate with the
endowment. In real per capita terms, the government budget constraint can be written as follows:
gt = ty + (1  
1
1 + 





with Mt = (1 + t)Mt 1 and   0, where  is the net money growth rate and  is the cost parameter. Note, the
consolidated government coordinates the activities of the treasury and the central bank, both of which are “equally
subservient to the government”. The benevolent government maximises the steady state level of welfare for all future
generations, obtained by substituting the equilibrium decision rules into the agents’ utility function(s) to determine the
optimal levels of the policy variables.6
3 Optimal Policy Decisions
In this section, we analyse the optimal policies for the government in the face of a rise in the cost of tax collection. For
this purpose, we study the behaviour of a benevolent government or social planner who maximises the utility of all con-
sumers, evaluated at the steady state, by choosing ,  and , following alternative values of . Speciﬁcally, using 
6A competitive equilibrium for this model economy is a sequence of prices fpt, idt, iltg1
t=0, allocations ct+1g1
t=0, stocks of ﬁnancial assets
fmt, dtg1
t=0, and policy variables ft, t, t, gtg1
t=0 such that: The consumer’s optimal choices are made via (2) and (3); banks maximise proﬁts
such that (5) holds; the goods and money markets clear, i.e., y + W - 1
22
t y = ct+1 +ce
t+1 + gt+1, and Mt=tptdt, respectively, holds, and the
government budget, equation (11) is balanced on a period-by-period basis.
7= 1, the problem for the social planner, with the discount rate 0<<1, is captured by:
P1
i=0 i[  log(ct+1+i) +
(1    )log(gt+1+i)], in the case where public good is useful, and
P1
i=0 i[log(ct+1+i)], when public expendi-






1  log(ct). Equations (3) and (11) are substituted into the respective welfare functions to give the following:
 
1  log[(1 + rdt+1)(1   t)y] +
1  
1  log(y + (1   1
1+)(1   )y   1
22
t y) and 1
1  log[(1 + rdt+1)(1   t)y].
Where 1 + rdt+1 = (1   t+1)(1 + xt+1) + t+1
1
1+t+1.
The respective welfare functions are maximised subject to the following inequality constraints:  0,   0.99;






t is added. Further, we assume that the government follows time invariant policy rules,
which means that the institutionally determined tax rate, t, the cash reserve ratio, t, and the money growth rate, t
are constant over time.
The problem of the social planner is non-linear in , , and , and hence cannot be solved analytically. Numerical
solution of the problem, in turn, requires values for the structural parameters of the model. For our experiments below,
we use the following set of values: y is normalised to 1;  = 1.0, as seen above; 7  = 0.98 (Chari et al.(1995)) ;
x = 2 percent (Bhattacharya and Haslag (2001));   = 0.75, 0.50 and 0.25. Based on  = 25.00 percent,  = 17.30
percent and,  =  = 21.40 percent, obtained from Haslag and Young (1998),8 the results yield a value of  = 33.66
percent, when we take into account, that costs of tax collection amounts to 3 percent of total revenue in developing
countries (Bird and Zolt (2005) and Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007)). Given the values of , , ,  and y, the size of
the government, derived from the government budget constraint, is equal to 21.77 percent. For deducing that ﬁnancial
repression is positively correlated with the cost of tax enforcement, we start with our benchmark case of  = 0. Finally,
to check the robustness of our results, we also use =0.01,  = 0.05 and  = 0.09.9
The results of the experiments have been reported in Table 1. Column 1 of the table reports the alternative sizes of
the cost parameter. Columns 2 to 4, 6 to 8 and 10 to 12 report the respective optimal values of ,  and  under   =
0.75, 0.50 and 0.25, i.e, these columns correspond to the three cases where the government expenditure is valued less,
equally and more than the consumption good, by the consumer. Columns 5, 9 and 13 report the respective levels of the
7Our basic results continued to hold for  = 1
2 and 2.0.
8The authors derive these values as averages based on 82 countries.
9See below for further details, on the choice of these values of .
8welfare value under the different values of   as the cost of tax collection, , increases. The optimal policy parameters
and obtained social welfare, when the government expenditures are pure government consumption, are reported in
Columns 14 through 17.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
The following observations can be made from Table 1:
Useful Public Expenditures (Columns 2 through 13): (a) When  = 0, i.e., there is no cost of tax collection, the
optimal money growth rate is always set at inﬁnity, while reserve requirements are always set at zero, irrespective of
the weight the consumer assigns to private consumption and the public good in the utility function. Given that the
reserve requirement, which measures the size of the seigniorage base, is equal to zero, the optimal seigniorage is zero
in this case. The optimal value of the tax rate, is, however, set equal to the weight of the government good in the utility
function. (b) When  = 0.01, the basic results are reversed, when compared to (a). Now all the revenue is raised via
seigniorage, with money growth rate set at inﬁnity and the reserve requirement set to the weight of the government
good in the utility function.  = 0.01, thus serving as a threshold for the switch from explicit to implicit taxation. (c)
Moreover, with = 0.05 and  = 0.3366, and beyond, the results in (b) stay the same. (d) Across the different weights
on the consumption and public good, the size of the optimal value of the welfare, though, remains unaffected following
changes in the optimal policy decisions with varying costs of tax collection.
Useless Public Expenditures (Columns 14 through 17): (a) The optimal policy decisions of the government are
qualitatively the same as above. However, the threshold required for the switch from direct to indirect taxation takes
place at a higher threshold value of , speciﬁcally, 0.09, beyond which the results continue to be the same. Intuitively,
this is because, in this case, the government expenditure is not useful to the consumers, and hence higher costs of
tax collection do not directly affect the utility in an adverse manner. So, unless the cost parameter is high enough to
adversely affect the government budget constraint, the switch does not take place. Thus, understandably the cut-off
value for the cost parameter to cause the government to move to seigniorage completely is higher, when compared
to the case of productive public expenditures. (b) Further, note that the tax rates and the reserve requirements, when
positive, are tied to the size of the government, i.e.,
g
y. (c) Until the threshold level of  = 0.09, the optimal money
growth rate continues to stay at zero, and then rises to inﬁnity. (d) Finally, the size of the optimal value of the welfare,
9as in the case of purposeful public expenditures, remain unaffected following changes in the optimal policy decisions
with varying costs of tax collection.
Thus, in summary, one can draw the following general conclusions:
 Small costs of tax collection can ensure positive levels of ﬁnancial repression.
 However, the cost of tax enforcement cannot produce monotonic increases in ﬁnancial repression.
 Beyond a certain level of the cost of tax collection, movements in the reserve requirements are governed by
weights attached to the government good, or by the size of the government.
 So, as far as thereliance on indirect taxation, in our case seigniorage, is concerned, we show that positive (minor)
costs of tax collection can lead to positive levels of indirect taxation, as a welfare maximising outcome. Inter-
estingly, in Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007), the welfare optimising outcome indicated the direct and consumption
taxes to be substitutable irrespective of whether the exogenous cost of tax collection was zero or positive.
 Our results, are, however, relatively comparable to when we consider the case of positive and endogenous cost
of tax collection discussed in Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007). The authors show that growth-maximising direct
and (consumption) indirect taxation are negatively related to their respective (and cross) costs of tax collection.
However, the growth-maximising value of the consumption tax rate is zero when collection costs do not exist,
and hence the government completely relied on direct taxes. In contrast to Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007), our
results are based on a welfare optimising outcome, and the fact that our model cannot account for a positive
monotonic relationship between seigniorage and the costs of direct tax collection.
4 Conclusion
When numerically analysed for a world economy, the following basic conclusions are made: (i) Beyond a threshold
value, positive costs of tax collection result in ﬁnancial repression as a welfare maximising outcome. (ii) However,
costs of tax collection and ﬁnancial repression do not possess a monotonic positive relationship. On and beyond the
threshold level, the role and size of the government is critical in the analysis. In fact, as pointed out above, beyond
a certain level of the cost of tax collection, movements in the reserve requirements are governed by weights attached
10to the government good or the size of the government. So, in general, the paper shows that a benevolent social
planner would only rely on seigniorage once the cost of tax enforcement crosses a threshold limit, with the latter being
relatively higher, when public expenditures are not valued by the consumers.
An immediate extension of the current study would be to revisit our results using an endogenous growth framework
similar to the one used by Ag´ enor and Neanidis (2007), and to include a monetary side, for we strongly believe that
such a framework will help us to produce the monotonicity in the relationship between the cost of tax collection and
the policy parameters.
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